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ABSTRACT 
 The trade relation among countries does not necessarily benefit all members, in that case it so common 
for issue to arise that often turns to be dispute. Interestingly, the role of WTO somehow does not fulfill the gap, 
sometimes it is necessary to add additional mechanism to resolve the dispute. At the end the result can be 
obtained by the members. This research focuses on the diplomacy process between Indonesian and South Korea 
regarding the dumping issue on paper commodity. It should be noted that South Korea has not fully implemented 
the obligation after DSB Appellate Body’s decision on 2005 and 2007. As for the research question, this research 
comes out with “what the strategy is imposed by Indonesian government to settle the dispute on paper 
dumping?”. The Indonesian diplomacy for the South Korean Government to implement the final decision of the 
DSB Panel of WTO through the use of linkage strategy in the form of cross retaliation plan and putting ADD on 
all South Korean paper producers. At the end South Korean Government through KTC finally formally revoked 
the policy of the ADD which marked the great achievement and victory of Indonesia in the WTO mechanism. 
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ABSTRAK 
Hubungan dagang antar negara tidak selalu menguntungkan semua anggota, mengingat hal ini sangat 
umum muncul sehingga dapat menyebabkan terjadinya perselisihan. Menariknya, WTO justru menyebabkan 
kesenjangan yang diperlukan ditambahkan mekanisme tambahan untuk menyelesaikan perselisihan 
perdagangan tersebut. Pada akhirnya hasilnya tersebut dapat dihasilkan oleh negara-negara anggota. 
Penelitian ini berfokus pada proses diplomasi antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan mengenai isu dumping pada 
komoditas kertas. Perlu dicatat bahwa Korea Selatan belum sepenuhnya menerapkan kewajiban tersebut setelah 
keputusan Banding Banding DSB WTO pada tahun 2005 dan 2007. Dalam pertanyaan penelitian, riset ini 
memiliki pertanyaan “Strategi apa yang dilakukan oleh Pemerintah Indonesia untuk menyelesaikan perselisihan 
tentang dumping kertas?”. Diplomasi Indonesia untuk Pemerintah Korea Selatan untuk menerapkan keputusan 
akhir Panel DSB WTO melalui penggunaan strategi linkage dalam bentuk rencana retaliasi silang dan 
mengenakan Bea Masuk Anti-Dumping (BMAD) terhadap semua produsen kertas Korea Selatan. Pada akhirnya 
Pemerintah Korea Selatan melalui KTC akhirnya secara resmi mencabut kebijakan BMAD yang menandai 
pencapaian dan kemenangan besar Indonesia dalam mekanisme WTO. 
 
Kata kunci: korea selatan; dumping; diplomasi perdagangan; teori linkage; retaliasi 
 
Introduction 
On 2002 South Korea imposed Anti-
Dumping Duty (ADD) on the certain category 
of paper which is uncoated wood-free printing 
paper imported from Indonesia. South Korea 
assumes that Indonesia paper exporter 
companies which are PT. Indah Kiat Pulp & 
Paper Tbk, PT. Pindo Deli Pulp & Mills, PT. 
Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk, and April Pine 
Paper Trading Pte Ltd are believed to do 
dumping practice. As the result of 
implementation ADD, Indonesian domestic 
industries suffer from material loss and the 
downfall of export revenue. In short, the 
implementation of ADD turns to make the 
price of Indonesian paper on South Korea 
market to be more expensive. 
  
As the case goes by, on 2005 the 
Appellate Body under Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) WTO decides that Indonesia is 
not proven with the charges of dumping 
practice and claims that South Korea is the 
party which violating the rules by applying 
ADD. The case continues on 2010 when 
Indonesian government is pleading WTO 
regarding retaliation since South Korea does 
not immediately comply with DSB Panel 
Body’s decision on 2005 and 2007. As a 
response to that South Korea government 
suddenly agrees to cut the ADD on October 
2010. Based on the brief overview of the case, 
it can be seen that South Korea government 
deliberately choose to not comply with WTO’s 
decision on 2005 but then suddenly change its 
position on 2010. 
This research uses qualitative research 
method which is done deductively by using 
primary and secondary data. Primary data 
based on WTO decision, in the form of 
Request for Consultation and Panel Report on 
Korea - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Certain Paper from Indonesia (Dispute No: 
DS312). While the secondary data used various 
sources that have links about this case, among 
others: literature study through literature 
books, journals, articles, and mass media so 
that it can compare and enrich the writings 
comprehensively. In data analysis techniques, 
the authors use data analysis based on primary 
and secondary data that already exist. By 
sorting the facts obtained then adapted to WTO 
theory and rules. Then explain how the causes, 
reasons, effects, and violations by South Korea 
against WTO rules. 
During the negotiations, Indonesia 
tends to use trade diplomacy through the use of 
Linkage Strategy in order that South Korea 
implemented to the final decision of the WTO 
DSB Panel. The Indonesian linkage strategy is 
through the plan of the retaliation to the South 
Korean commodities and the implementation 
of ADD to all of the country's paper exporters 
to Indonesia simultaneously. 
In conducting negotiations, Indonesia 
has always insisted that South Korea 
immediately withdraw the imposition of ADD 
on Sinar Mas Group companies and 
consistently undertake a plan to request 
authorization of the WTO to run the retaliation. 
At the same time, the Indonesian government 
also firmly to impose ADD on all the South 
Korean paper companies with a large 
percentage, in order to give a strong message 
that Indonesia is serious about protecting its 
domestic interests. 
The differences between this research 
and any researchers before are the authors 
explain clearly and coherently since the 
background of the problem to the completion 
of this case complete with analysis since Panel 
session of 2004, 2005, and 2010. Meanwhile, 
other research only discussed on Indonesia 
winning over South Korea in the dispute during 
the WTO DSB Panel in 2004, without further 
explaining what factors led to the case being 
won by Indonesia and completed in October 
2010. 
 
Trade Diplomacy Framework 
On her work, Susan Strange1 states that 
dynamic changes of global world consequently 
implicate on the structural changes in each 
country. It also applies to economic matter, for 
example, a country that previously has been so 
protective turns to be more open with its 
economic system and fostering export. The 
changes on international system turn to be the 
trigger for a country to apply trade diplomacy 
as a response to the global economy but still at 
the same time still protecting its national 
economic interest. Trade diplomacy focuses on 
the diplomacy process among countries under 
the same trade organization in this case WTO. 
Donna Lee 2  believes that trade 
diplomacy provides an understanding of the 
                                                 
1  Susan Strange, States, Firms and Diplomacy. 
International Affairs, pp. 1-15. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 1992. 
2 Donna Lee dan Brian Hocking, Economic 
Diplomacy. The International Studies Encyclopedia 
II, 1216-1227. Birmingham: Departement of Political 
and International Studies. 2010. 
  
processes occurring within the WTO and the 
workings of the institutional environment in 
WTO negotiations, diplomatic strategy to 
equalize with developed countries. Trade 
diplomacy also allows domestic issues and 
changes in the structure of the political 
economy to be an important consideration 
because before negotiating at the international 
level, any country must accommodate and pay 
attention to their domestic needs. This 
illustrates how the complex and dynamic 
character of trade diplomacy is constantly 
changing along with the development of the 
international world. 
Roy3 also argued that the economy is 
an integral part of contemporary diplomacy as 
the economy can influence other policies, even 
as increasing interdependence between 
countries related to economy and trade causes 
the economy to become one of the main 
sectors. The current economy is not only used 
as a ‘national target’ but also as a standard of 
successful development of a country, it also 
requires the existence of diplomacy. In 
summary, a country can’t achieve its economic 
interests optimally if it does not make political 
efforts through diplomacy with other countries 
or international organizations. The 
implementation of diplomacy can be done 
according to Roy in the form of trade 
diplomacy through negotiations at the WTO 
forum which allows any country to struggle for 
their interests and resolve disputes that occur in 
order to improve the economy and trade. 
In trade diplomacy framework there 
are two important things that determine the 
success or failure of any country in running the 
framework. Two things are linkage strategy 
and bargaining position, the explanation is that 
if negotiations between countries use 
settlement tactics with other things outside the 
negotiations, then, in the end, can improve the 
bargaining position of the country. The 
bargaining position then will determine the 
winning or loss of any country in the WTO 
                                                 
3  Roy S. L., Diplomasi. Jakarta: Raja Grafindo 
Persada. 1998. 
negotiation forum. In the end, the 
implementation of trade diplomacy can make a 
developing country equal to other developed 
countries while still struggling for their 
domestic economic interests. 
According to Brian Brow4, the linkage 
can be used as a strategy on dispute settlement 
by enhancing the trade-off position of the 
country, especially on the economic issue. The 
theory has two main objectives which are; a) 
creating the bigger possibility for parties to 
dispute to reach settlement and b) creating room 
for another country to actively participate on the 
issue. Linkage theory also provides the 
opportunity to change the asymmetrical map 
during the negotiation and inventing bigger 
room to achieve national interest. The linkage 
theory aims to give psychological pressure on 
the counterpart member that has been 
provocative then creates any disadvantages to 
another country. The implementation of this 
theory is hoped to gradually change the rival’s 
mindset to follow certain nation interest. 
And then, in the last few decades in 
international relations, it can be seen that 
bargaining position turns to be the vital factor. 
Bargaining position mainly talks that country 
may propose offer and feedback at the same 
time to another country. The approach is so 
called by take-it-or-leave-it game. The theory 
claims that a country might enjoy higher 
position compared to other countries by 
maximizing strategic dependency so that 
during the negotiation process that country will 
be dominated. 
David A. Lake. (2009) claims that 
states are rational actors which selectively 
choose offers5. In this case, the various offers 
from a certain country can be used as the tool 
to suppress another country in order to achieve 
its national interest. On the dumping case 
                                                 
4 Brian Bow, The Politics of Linkage: Power, 
Interdependence, and Ideas in Canada-US Relations. 
Toronto: UBC Press. 2009. 
5 David A. Lake, Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory 
(pp. 07-51). New York: Cornell University Press. 
2009. 
  
between Indonesia – South Korea, it can be 
seen that Indonesia enjoys higher position 
during the negotiation since the WTO decides 
that Indonesian companies are not proven with 
the charges of dumping practice. Otherwise, 
South Korea turns to be in a weak position due 
to its loose and its responsibility to comply 
with WTO DSB’s decision. 
The relations with the disputes 
between South Korea and Indonesia's 
diplomacy, the author uses the analysis by 
using trade diplomacy as it relates to the theory 
of the study, which shows the WTO forum 
used by Indonesia is used to fight for 
maximum national economic interests. In 
addition, the Government of Indonesia also 
uses bilateral negotiation channels through the 
Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia 
with South Korea and the Indonesian paper 
companies. Diplomacy and trade negotiations 
were undertaken by Indonesia by advocating 
and various other processes to demonstrate 
Indonesia's position and emphasizing South 
Korea to comply with the DSB WTO's final 
decision since 2005. 
There was a tendency for the 
Government of Indonesia to negotiate 
negotiations using the linkage approach 
through the use of other issues outside the 
dispute to put pressure on South Korea to 
comply with existing DSB WTO decisions. 
This is due to the multilateral structural failure 
of the WTO to ensure South Korea to comply 
with the final decision of the dispute, requiring 
an ‘additional’ approach bilaterally by the 
Government of Indonesia to lobby politics to 
achieve national interests. In addition, South 
Korea's protectionist act of unilaterally 
accusing Indonesian paper companies of 
dumping practices and inclined not to comply 
with the final decision of the WTO DSB Panel 
is detrimental to Indonesian paper producers. 
Naturally, if the Government of Indonesia 
seeks to struggle for its domestic interests by 
using linkage strategy in the form of the use of 
other trade issues, in order to ‘suppress’ South 
Korea so as not too provocatively harm the 
interests of Indonesia, but to soften and 
immediately obey the existing DSB WTO 
decision. 
Also, the Indonesian government has a 
larger bargaining position because Indonesia 
has sufficient data and proven valid in DSB 
WTO which is then added with linkage 
strategy that is run in order to pressure South 
Korea to immediately revoke the decision of 
imposition of ADD on the export of paper 
products of Indonesia. The consideration of 
retaliation measures against imported 
commodities originating from South Korea is 
also a major source of capital for Indonesia to 
comply with the decision of the DSB WTO 
Panel. 
 
Analysis6 
The dispute between Indonesia – South 
Korea began on September 30th 2002 when a 
group of Korean papers companies file report to 
Korean Trade Commission (KTC). The Korea 
papers industries claim that Indonesian 
companies under Sinar Mas Group are suspected 
to do dumping practice on a certain type of 
paper which is uncoated wood-free printing 
paper. The Korean companies then bring the 
report to KTC to applying anti-dumping petition. 
It is on November 3rd 2003 that KTC 
officially imposed various value of Anti-
Dumping Duty (ADD) for the next three years 
starting from 2003 – 2006 on several 
Indonesian companies. KTC imposes 8,22% of 
ADD to Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk, PT. 
Pindo Deli Pulp & Mills, and PT. Indah Kiat 
Pulp & Paper Tbk. At the same time, KTC also 
imposes lower ADD which is 2,8% to April 
Pine Paper Trading Pte Ltd. 
The direct implication of ADD can be 
seen on the material loss and decreased export 
value faced Indonesian papers companies. As 
for the fall of export value, for example, the 
drastic decreased can be seen on the following 
                                                 
6 Muhammad Ridha Iswardhana, Analisis Diplomasi 
Indonesia Dalam Menyelesaikan Sengketa 
Perdagangan Dumping Barang WTO: Studi Kasus 
Sengketa Kertas (pp. 1-67). Yogyakarta: Universitas 
Gadjah Mada. 2017. 
  
number; previously before the implementation 
of ADD Indonesia export value to South Korea 
reach into USD 150 million annually. The 
number falls significantly into USD 50 million 
annually right after the implementation of 
ADD. 
As a respond to that Indonesian 
government brings the case to DSB under 
WTO. On October 28
th 2005 the panel files 
report stating that Korean policy on anti-
dumping is violating the rules of anti-dumping 
on WTO. The panel also concludes that South 
Korea must immediately erase anti-dumping 
policy immediately as what is governed by 
Reason-Able Period of Time / RPT or that 
soon will be ended in July 2006.7 
Since South Korea government does 
not show positive gesture considering the result 
from DSB. Indonesia government then decides 
to bring the case for the second time to the 
panel. The panel does not change the result. On 
June 22nd 2007 the panel decides that Indonesia 
is winning over South Korea. The decision of 
the panel on June 22nd 2007 is legalized by the 
second report of the panel on October 22nd 
2007. It is also during that period that 
Indonesia government claims that if South 
Korea government does not immediately erase 
ADD, Indonesia plans to choose retaliation as a 
settlement.8 
On 2007, KTC still does not erase the 
ADD that actually should be erased earlier on 
July 2006. Indonesia government then 
initiating negotiation mechanism by working 
together with related stakeholders. The 
Department of Foreign Trade under Ministry of 
Trade conducts a consultation with Legal 
Opinion Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
(ACWL) on Oct 31st – Nov 2nd 2008. The 
consultation is meant to measure the material 
                                                 
7  World Trade Organization. Report of the Panel: 
Korea — Anti-Dumping Duties On Imports Of 
Certain Paper From Indonesia (WT/DS312). Geneva: 
WTO. 2005. 
8 Joseph Frankel, Contemporary International Theory 
and Behaviour of State. (pp. 8). New York: Free 
Press. 1972. 
loss as the foundation to plan retaliation. As a 
response to Indonesia’s complaint, ACWL 
claims that Indonesia needs to include the 
recommendation from DSB WTO regarding 
the retaliation plan.9 
Indonesian government argues that the 
retaliation cannot wait. The government plan to 
propose a compensation of material loses based 
on the material injury faced by Indonesian 
paper companies. Indonesia also warns South 
Korea that retaliation is fixed plan if the 
government still imposes ADD.10 It should be 
noted that actually, Indonesian government 
does not want retaliation as the final step to 
settle the case since it will ruin the relation of 
two countries. 
Interestingly, according to Ministry of 
Finance Regulation No. 26/PMK.011/2010, on 
February 1st 2010 Indonesian government also 
imposes ADD to various Korean papers 
companies. The value of ADD to Korea is also 
the highest among other countries which reach 
up to 59,64% whereas Indonesia only imposes 
6-40% to other countries.11 It can be seen that 
the policy conducted by Indonesia government 
is not a form of retaliation. Indonesia prefers to 
choose another strategy to suppress South 
Korea. 
On May 18th 2010 and June 22nd 2010 
Indonesia state that government will take 
another legal system process to DSB WTO if 
South Korea still imposing ADD. Indonesia 
argues that it is not fair for Indonesian 
companies since the ADD has been imposed 
                                                 
9  Departemen Perdagangan. Laporan Akuntabilitas 
Kinerja Departemen Perdagangan 2008 (pp. 86). 
Jakarta: Departemen Perdagangan. 2008. 
10  detik.com. Kasus Dumping Kertas RI Siapkan 
Tindakan Balasan ke Korea. Retrieved from 
http://finance.detik.com/ekonomi-
bisnis/844599/kasus-dumping-kertas-ri-siapkan-
tindakan-balasan-ke-korea. 
 11  detik.com. Menkeu Berlakukan Bea Masuk Anti 
Dumping Produk Kertas Impor. Retrieved from 
http://finance.detik.com/ekonomi-
bisnis/1295410/menkeu-berlakukan-bea-masuk-anti-
dumping-produk-kertas- impo. 
 
  
since 2003. Finally, on October 21
st 2010 KTC 
erase ADD to five Indonesia companies under 
Sinar Mas Group. The KTC decision is 
followed up with the policy release on October 
30th 2010 that officially dismisses the ADD to 
all Indonesian papers commodity. 12  In this 
research, author uses five subs heading of 
discussion based on the result of this research.  
a. Indonesian Diplomacy 
b. Linkage Issues: The Government of 
Indonesia's Retaliation 
Implementation Plan 
c. Bargaining Indonesia’s Position  
d. Changes in South Korea's Attitude 
e. Opportunities of Developing 
Countries in WTO 
 
a. Indonesian Diplomacy 
In line with trade diplomacy that 
provides an understanding of the processes in 
WTO negotiations used by developing countries 
to make equalization to the developed countries, 
and it must accommodate the national interest. 
The flexibility of international trade has led to 
disputes among WTO member states that can be 
resolved through the DSB WTO mechanism. In 
addition, the application of trade diplomacy 
through the WTO forum can not only solve the 
dispute, but also can improve the economy and 
trade of each party of the dispute countries. This 
is also done by Indonesia by struggling for the 
settlement of this dumping paper dispute case so 
that South Korea can immediately comply with 
the decision of DSB WTO Panel and Indonesia's 
paper export is not interrupted by South Korea's 
unilateral ADD imposition. 
In the dispute on dumping papers, 
Indonesia chooses to elaborate several 
strategies and work hand by hand by including 
various actors. At first, Indonesia bring the case 
to WTO since trade organization has the 
authority to settle down with any dispute 
                                                 
12  Okezone.com. Korsel Sepakat Hentikan Bea 
Masuk Anti Dumping Kertas RI. Retrieved from 
http://economy.okezone.com/read/2010/11/08/320/39
1032/korsel-sepakat-hentikan-bea-masuk-anti-
dumping- kertas-ri. 
among the members but then since WTO 
cannot force South Korea to comply with the 
result Indonesia then chooses another strategy. 
In order to settle the case, Indonesia conducts 
several bilateral meetings with Korean official 
representative. In addition, Indonesia also 
keeps correspondence with ACWL to give 
additional enforcement to South Korea. The 
combination of several strategies reflects 
Indonesia persistence on the case and at the 
same time also showing that as developing 
countries Indonesia’s position is equal with 
developed countries like South Korea. 
The role of Indonesian Ministry of 
Trade plays an important role in the settlement 
of this case. The ministry is not only covering 
paper companies but more broadly representing 
Indonesia’s interest on WTO. In addition, the 
Department of Foreign Trade under Ministry of 
Trade also conducts series of diplomacy with 
South Korea through correspondence, informal 
meeting, and also the role of Trade attaché and 
Ambassador abroad. Also, There are several 
actors involved in the settlement of this case 
from the Ministry of Commerce, including: 
Tim Nasional  Perundingan Perdagangan  
Internasional  (PPI), Direktorat  Jenderal  
Kerjasama  Perdagangan  Luar Negeri 
(currently Direktorat Jenderal Perundingan 
Perdagangan Internasional), Indonesian 
Ambassador to WTO, and Indonesian Trade 
Attaché in Vienna. 
In this case, Indonesia makes use 
retaliation and ADD issues to force South 
Korea in order to comply with DSB result, 
Indonesia is willing to accept the material loses 
faced by domestic paper industries as a 
sacrifice to make South Korea comply with 
DSB result. As for the imposing of ADD, it is 
reflected as the serious gesture of Indonesia 
government to protect its national interest. In 
solving this paper dumping dispute case the 
Government of Indonesia uses a mix of efforts 
and actors. Initially, Indonesia brought this 
issue within the scope of WTO negotiations to 
be resolved fairly in accordance with the WTO 
rules and the right of Indonesia as a member 
country, but the WTO failed to ensure South 
  
Korea's compliance with the DSB Panel's 
recommendations. 
As a result, Indonesia uses a bilateral 
approach by lobbying through a series of 
meetings and consultations with South Korea. 
Diplomacy by the Government of Indonesia is 
also conducted by conducting correspondence 
or consultation with ACWL in order to put 
pressure on the South Korean side. Not only 
relying on state actors, Indonesian paper 
companies also have a role to follow the 
process of re-investigation conducted by KTC 
and voiced their opinion to the Government of 
Indonesia for this case to be completed soon. 
Various diplomatic efforts illustrate the 
seriousness of Indonesia and the unity of all 
existing stakeholders as South Korea's slow 
response and show as a developing country, 
Indonesia also has an equal and strong position. 
As for the bargaining position, Indonesia’s 
position can be higher than South Korea in this 
case.  
b. Linkage Issues: The Government of 
Indonesia's Retaliation 
Implementation Plan 
Reflecting on the losses of this case, 
the Government of Indonesia as a member of the 
WTO has the right to retaliate to other countries 
with the permission of the DSB WTO. This 
retaliation is an attempt by the plaintiff country 
to be harmed by the defendant country if it does 
not comply with the recommendation of the 
DSB Panel of WTO and as a way to obtain 
compensation if no agreement is reached in 
compensation in accordance with WTO rules. 
The efforts made by the Government of 
Indonesia before deciding on retaliation are by 
giving statements to South Korea on the 
possibility of retaliation as at the time of the 
bilateral meeting on December 10, 2007. 
In addition, when Indonesia consulted 
with ACWL on 31 October-02 November 2008, 
the agency recommended Indonesia previously 
had to calculate the number of losses suffered by 
Indonesia due to South Korea's ADD policy as a 
basis for retaliation of the country. In line with 
ACWL's suggestion, the Ambassador of the 
Republic of Indonesia to WTO also briefly 
submitted a request for retaliation rights against 
South Korea in the DSB WTO Session on 08 
January 2008. Although the Minister of Trade of 
the Republic of Indonesia on February 25 2008 
issued its objection if Indonesia in a short time 
carry out retaliation because it can threaten 
Indonesia's credibility in the international world 
and the limited human resources, but did not 
minimize the desire of Indonesia on 06 March 
2010 and 22 June 2010 to increase this case to 
the WTO DSB Appeal Apparatus followed a 
request for authorization of retaliation from the 
WTO.  
Then, in a meeting between the Dirjen 
Kerjasama Perdagangan Luar Negeri 
Kementerian Perdagangan with the South 
Korean Ambassador to Indonesia on October 03, 
2010 states that Indonesia can retaliate not only 
on the same commodities of paper but also 
another imported commodities from South 
Korea that were valued at Indonesia's losses due 
to ADD to Indonesian paper export 
commodities. 
 
c. Bargaining Indonesia’s  Position  
In further examination of the 
negotiations undertaken by Indonesia and South 
Korea during the settlement of the dispute, the 
case can be given due to the bargaining position, 
mainly from the Indonesian side. The existence 
of a strong bargaining position allows a country 
to make offers and demands simultaneously, 
while other countries can accept or reject (take-
it-or-leave-it game). This can happen because, in 
bargaining, it allows for a higher position of a 
country than any other country by using strategic 
dependency, which causes in negotiation 
negotiations a state actor can have a more 
dominant bargaining position. The high 
bargaining position depends on the level of 
credibility of the threat and the existing situation 
so as to limit the choice of others who can force 
to agree on the agreement. In realizing a strong 
bargaining position, it is also necessary to pay 
attention to the interests of international actors 
and interests from within the country itself and 
to support the unity of domestic interest is 
  
important to do first. This is because if a country 
cannot unite domestic demands into one vote, it 
can undermine the bargaining position of a 
country negotiator in international negotiations. 
In relation to Indonesia's bargaining 
position which tends to be higher than that of 
South Korea in this case, according to the 
analysis of Indonesian authors have at least three 
leverage or strength that can be used as an effort 
making Indonesia much needed by South Korea 
in the settlement of this paper dumping dispute, 
among others: 
First, Indonesia wins two times on 
DSB Panel decision. The first is on 2005 and 
2007. The winning moment is used as an 
enforcement to make South Korea comply with 
DSB decision on 2005 and 2007. In 2005, the 
WTO DSB Panel ruled that South Korea's anti-
dumping policy has been violated and not in 
line with the Anti-Dumping WTO provisions 
and indirectly won Indonesia in this case. The 
decision of the DSB Panel of WTO also 
mandates South Korea to immediately 
implement the DSB WTO recommendation by 
revoking anti-dumping policy against various 
Indonesian paper companies in a timely and 
rational (Reason-Able Period Of Time / RPT) 
period or at the latest eight months after the 
issuance of the decision Or ending in July 
2006. Subsequently, Indonesia again won this 
dispute in the 2007 DSB WTO Panel Session, 
which emphasized South Korea's reluctance not 
to immediately revoke and eliminate ADD 
policies against several Indonesian paper 
producers. Both triumphs indicate the 
magnitude of the Indonesian Government's 
attention to this dumping dispute case in order 
to protect its national interests and show the 
international community that Indonesia as a 
developing country also has equal rights and 
bargaining power over the developed world. 
Furthermore, these two consecutive wins also 
became a major capital for Indonesia in 
'pressuring' South Korea in order to comply 
with the recommendations of the 2005 and 
2007 DSB WTO Panel decisions. 
Secondly, South Korea does not have a 
strong database and information to prove that 
Indonesia is dumping, but South Korea must 
immediately comply with the DSB WTO 
decision because biases of existing decisions 
are detrimental to Indonesia's domestic 
interests. This is due to KTC parties who use 
more pricing data from importers in their 
country and based on reports from petitioning 
companies. While data derived from the 
Indonesian side and the five companies Sinar 
Mas Group tend to be used only as secondary 
data only, but the data is the main data from the 
manufacturer. The KTC database caused a 
difference and miscalculation in calculating the 
price, making the impression that the 
Indonesian paper companies had committed 
dumping practices to the detriment of South 
Korea. Proven in both DSB WTO Panel 
Sessions 2005 and 2007, the KTC representing 
South Korea is considered to have made a 
mistake in calculating and making decisions 
regarding the imposition of ADD on Indonesia. 
The unilateral use of KTC databases and 
unilateral information may undermine the 
credibility and trust of the institution, both 
within South Korea and other countries. KTC 
certainly cannot continuously maintain the use 
of invalid data, because this institution not only 
faces cases from Indonesia alone but also from 
all countries in the world. On the other hand, 
Indonesia has a more accurate and proven 
database and information base in both DSB 
WTO Panel Sessions can be leveraged in the 
settlement of this dispute for Indonesia, as there 
is no longer any reason for KTC to impose 
ADD on Sinar Mas Group companies and 
immediately revoke Policy. At this time, 
Indonesia argues that South Korea does not 
have any concrete and valid data to justify its 
argument that Indonesia is positively do 
dumping practice. Whereas, Indonesia is able 
to show relevant and concrete data that 
Indonesian industries under Sinar Mas Group 
do not do dumping practice. 
Third, according to the statistic during 
2004-2010 Indonesia is able to maintain its 
position as the third pulp paper exporter to 
South Korea after the United States (USD 424 
million) and Canada (USD 397 million). Also, 
  
Indonesia supplies about 10-16% of South 
Korea demand on paper. The magnitude of 
Indonesia's paper export to the fulfillment of 
South Korean needs can occur because the 
Indonesian paper industry has the availability 
of resources, labor, and processing technology 
is good enough, causing the production cost of 
paper and pulp from Indonesia is still relatively 
cheap when compared with countries 
Scandinavian or other Asian. In addition, the 
price of Indonesian paper exported to South 
Korea is also not much different from that of 
exports in China, between USD 0.43 / ton and 
USD 0.45 / ton. This shows that although the 
selling price of Indonesian paper is relatively 
cheap, but not too big difference between one 
country with other countries export paper 
destination. The policy of imposition of BMAD 
by South Korea on Sinar Mas Group 
companies is detrimental to Indonesia, but the 
decrease of fulfillment requirement up to 80% 
of the amount normally purchased from 
Indonesia every year, is of course, detrimental 
to the South Korean paper industry. 
Consequently, the country's paper industry 
must meet its needs for paper and pulp raw 
materials from other countries, which of course 
has prices above Indonesia. As a result, The 
imposed of ADD is clearly give disadvantages 
to Indonesia but consequently, South Korea 
must fulfill the national demand by looking up 
to another supplier with a more expensive 
price.  
 
d. Changes in South Korea's Attitude 
 South Korea's case and compliance 
resolution process tend to take a long time since 
2003-2010 involving various actors to the WTO 
mechanism, but the diplomacy negotiation of the 
dumping dispute settlement between Indonesia 
and South Korea can be marked by compliance 
from South Korea. Although previously South 
Korea tended not to give a satisfactory response 
related to a series of correspondence and 
diplomatic meetings conducted by the 
Government of Indonesia in mid-2007-2010, 
there appears to be a change of attitude from the 
country. 
During the negotiation, The 
Government of Indonesia uses the linkage 
approach through the use of other issues outside 
the dispute to place emphasis on South Korea. 
Indonesia also has a better bargaining position 
because they have proven valid data in the DSB 
WTO with the possibility implementation of 
retaliation policy to the South Korea which are 
better bargaining power for Indonesia to make 
sure South Korea immediately implemented the 
decision of DSB WTO Panel. 
The South Korean government had 
insisted if the issued ADD policy is right. 
However, after Indonesia consulted with the 
WTO ACWL, it appears that South Korea is 
beginning to slightly "soften" as indicated by the 
Sunset Review initiation to further assess the 
ADD policy towards Sinar Mas Group. Sunset 
Review is quite important considering the 
implementation of ADD to various Indonesian 
paper companies should be completed in May 
2010 and the phases are the order to eliminate 
the ADD imposition policy. Furthermore, after 
the Government of Indonesia imposed the ADD 
on all South Korean paper exporters with very 
high margins, followed by a statement 
requesting authorization of retaliation by the 
Government of Indonesia in the DSB WTO 
Meeting in May 2010, the South Koreans 
became less provocative as in the years 
previous. Subsequently, on October 30, 2010, 
the South Korean Government decided to revoke 
and eliminate the imposition of ADD against 
Sinar Mas Group. 
In this case, South Korea does not have 
any other reason to continue the imposition of 
BMAD on Indonesian paper companies, since it 
was not initially supported by valid and strong 
data, which was further demonstrated by defeats 
in the 2005 and 2007 DSB WTO Panel Session. 
South Korea also continues to get a statement 
from Indonesia that will carry out cross-
retaliation, giving 'emphasis' to the country to 
immediately revoke the policy of ADD. At the 
same time, all of the South Korean paper 
exporter company earns ADD in the highest 
value from Indonesian Government, providing 
effective "Shock Therapy" against South Korea. 
  
This is because the value of ADD which reaches 
59.64% and done suddenly, can awaken and 
give an idea of how the losses gained as long as 
it is suffered by Indonesia materially. 
 
e. Opportunities of Developing 
Countries in WTO 
 As Developing country need to 
actively participate under WTO whether on 
dispute settlement process or the negotiation. 
The experience from WTO will make 
developing country easier to protecting its 
national interest which often used by developed 
countries to create the dispute. This case can be a 
lesson and experience for developing countries, 
when dealing with developed countries should 
not necessarily 'follow' just at the wishes of 
developed countries but can explore further 
things that can strengthen the position of 
developing countries. 
 If developing countries trying to avoid 
and rarely use the WTO forum primarily in 
dispute resolution, it can lose the opportunities 
and experience in international organization and 
get reported from the developed countries. In 
addition, this condition can certainly reduce the 
bargaining position of developing countries in 
the international arena. Whereas the dispute 
resolution mechanism through WTO provides 
greater opportunities and advantages than using 
only bilateral diplomacy channels. This is 
because bilateral diplomacy often has the 
influence and pressure of political things as well 
as other interests of the developed countries in 
dispute resolution. 
 The global trade gives equal 
advantages to develop and developing countries. 
In this case developing country is no longer 
dependence on the developed country since 
developing country is able to build networking 
with another developing country. Developing 
countries can strengthen partnerships with 
fellow developing countries. This could be one 
of the efforts of developing countries to raise 
awareness and struggle over an issue that is 
important for developing countries in the WTO. 
In addition, this partnership can improve 
relations and trade between developing 
countries, along with the world economic 
recession. 
 Also, developing country position on 
WTO will be strengthened with concrete and 
valid data as the basis to argue with developed 
country’s claim. This valid data can be one of 
the key points in conducting any diplomacy, 
particularly in dispute resolution within the 
WTO. This can improve the bargaining position 
of developing countries because it can show that 
developing countries are fighting for their 
interests seriously. In addition, valid data can 
also be a consideration for developing country 
governments in making every policy.  
 Furthermore, when facing developed 
countries, developing countries also need to be 
more careful and make an inventory every 
opportunity that can be used to struggling for 
their interests. Developing country needs to 
clearly point out the loophole that can be used to 
against developed country. The position of 
developing country with its rapid development 
of economic sector turns to be the advantage to 
lift up developing country position during the 
negotiation.  
 Subsequently, developing countries 
will resolve trade disputes through WTO 
forums, may utilize academic channels through 
apprenticeship programs for young lawyers, 
such as those offered by The WTO Appellate 
Body Secretariat and Legal Affairs Division and 
the Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL) in 
Geneva. The ACWL provide facilitation that 
indirectly enhances human expertise for example 
on international trade law. In this case, private 
sector is also able to work together with 
government to reduce the cost of dispute 
settlement. Developing countries can also train 
junior lawyer from private law firms to avoid 
always involving government representatives. 
This effort is quite important, considering that if 
you have to hire a foreign lawyer in Geneva, 
Switzerland would certainly cost a lot for 
developing countries. This can alleviate the cost 
of settling disputes within the WTO. 
 
  
Conclusion 
Indonesia’s strategy on the case can be 
seen on the trade diplomacy with South Korea 
as a way to make South Korean government 
comply with the recommendation from WTO. 
Indonesia makes use linkage issue and series of 
negotiation. As for the linkage issue, Indonesia 
proposes linkage issue by applying cross ADD 
scheme on paper commodity from South 
Korea. Indonesia chooses to this mechanism as 
the respond of its disappointment over South 
Korea. 
It can be seen that Indonesia 
successfully implement the strategy since 
Indonesia’s position on the case is higher than 
South Korea. It also needs to be considered that 
South Korea is projected to have the bigger 
material loss on its trade equilibrium than 
imposing ADD to Indonesia companies. The 
situation then changes South Korea’s position 
by dismissing the ADD policy. 
South Korea is proven to violate the 
anti-dumping regulation under WTO, the 
government then erases the ADD to papers 
commodity from Indonesia on October 30th 
2010. The decision of KTC turns to be the 
winning mark for Indonesia since, after the 
result, Indonesia papers industry will not get 
any material loss. Even the settlement process 
takes pretty long time; the case turns to be 
momentum for Indonesia. 
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